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Abstract
In previous decades, cyber-attacks have not been considered a threat to critical infrastructure. However, as the
Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) domains converge, the vulnerability of OT
infrastructure is being exploited. Nation-states, cyber criminals and hacktivists are moving to benefit from
economic and political gains. The OT network, i.e. Industrial Control System (ICS) is referred to within OT
infrastructure as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA). SCADA systems were introduced primarily
to optimise the data transfer within OT network infrastructure. The introduction of SCADA can be traced back to
the 1960’s, a time where cyber-attacks were not considered. Hence SCADA networks and associated systems are
highly vulnerable to cyber-attacks which can ultimately result in catastrophic events. Historically, when deployed,
intrusion detection systems in converged IT/OT networks are deployed and monitor the IT side of the network.
While academic research into OT specific intrusion detection is not a new direction, application to real systems
are few and lack the contextual information required to make intrusion detection systems actionable. This paper
provides an overview of cyber security in OT SCADA networks. Through evaluating the historical development of
OT systems and protocols, a range of current issues caused by the IT/OT convergence is presented. A number of
publicly disclosed SCADA vulnerabilities are outlined, in addition to approaches for detecting attacks in OT
networks. The paper concludes with a discussion of what the future of interconnected OT systems should entail,
and the potential risks of continuing with an insecure design philosophy.
Keywords
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INTRODUCTION
The global cost of cybercrime has risen by 66% to an average cost of USD$11.7 million per organisation since
2015 (Ponemon Institute LLC, 2017). In Australia, an average per company attributed USD$5.41 million to cyberattacks (Ponemon Institute LLC, 2017). This upward trending figure is potentially catastrophic to the political
and economic state of a country such as Australia. Following the targeted use of ransomware on critical
infrastructure such as the Kemuri Water Company (Kovacs, 2016), developing defences, which include detection
techniques, against the offensive use of cyber weaponry is essential.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems were introduced to automate processes in industries
such as oil and gas, water utilities, transportation, power generation and energy. SCADA systems allow operators
to monitor and communicate with onsite systems remotely through a Human Machine Interface (HMI). This
action of remotely controlled and monitoring the onsite systems has the advantage of a reduction in labour costs
and minimise associated errors associated with measurements. Furthermore, inbuilt alarm systems can be
monitored automatically rather than having humans checking with the risk of potentially miscalculating critical
data.
However, increased connectivity has introduced significant vulnerabilities from IT environments that previously
did not exist in OT environments. Cyber criminals have identified these vulnerabilities and have exploited for
financial and/or political gain. This paper presents an overview of OT systems, describing historical design
choices, system architecture, and vulnerabilities introduced from the convergence of IT and OT systems. Next,
the paper describes intrusion detection methods for OT systems, concluding with a discussion on what is required
to secure future OT systems from an increasing cyber threat.
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SCADA SYSTEM EVOLUTION
As information/data architectures and technology has evolved, including the convergence of IT and OT
technologies, the evolution of SCADA systems has also followed. SCADA systems started in the 1960’s and are
commonly separated into four generations:






First Generation – Monolithic SCADA Systems;
Second Generation – Distributed SCADA Systems;
Third Generation – Networked SCADA Systems; and
Fourth Generation – “Internet of Things” SCADA Systems (Kudłacik, Porwik, & Wesołowski,
2016).

As SCADA systems have evolved, they have adopted open network specifications for communications. The
evolution of protocols began with proprietary protocols including SCADA vendor specific protocols, e.g. Modbus
and Profibus, later the SCADA protocols were standardised through, IEC60870, IEC61850 and DNP3. These
protocols naturally have advantages, disadvantages and commonalities. As with advances in technology, industry
has increased the availability of control systems from remote locations. This has changed the behaviour that
SCADA processes the communications data from a predominately standalone system to communicating through
Wide Area Networks (WANs) and Local Area Networks (LANs) through TCP/IP protocols. Furthermore, the
improvement of networking technology resulting in network speed increases has increased the uptake of TCP/IP
protocols within OT systems. These improvements have hastened the move from EIA-232 and EIA-485 (serial)
to Ethernet and wireless (DigitalBond, 2018) mediums. There has also been a shift in the technology and
functionality associated with microprocessor devices or intelligent electronic devices (IEDs). This shift is to take
advantage of the increased network speeds and different transmission mediums, allowing for more complex
systems with finer timing requirements to be designed.

SCADA NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
SCADA systems operate on a node-to-node based topology that runs on the Data Link Layer (Layer Two) of the
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model that had been designed as a closed system. SCADA systems are used
to allow operators to monitor alerts and analyse real-time data collated from distributed processes such as gas
pipelines, hydroelectric generating facilities and power stations. Traditional SCADA systems are comprised of
five main components: Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) (Kolhar, Abd El-atty, & Rahmath, 2016),
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), Remote Telemetry Unit (RTU), Human Machine Interface (HMI) and
Historian system. The IEDs are microcomputer sensors that monitor the physical SCADA machine and relay data
to the PLC or RTU devices. PLCs and RTUs are devices that collect data from the IEDs then transmit the data to
the HMI application. An HMI is an application installed on a SCADA workstation that interprets the information
received from the PLC and RTU devices, allowing for a human operator to analyse and monitor the SCADA
system. The Historian system collects and stores SCADA network data for audit purposes (Nicholson, Webber,
Dyer, Patel, & Janicke, 2012).
Figure 1 illustrates a simple SCADA network architecture. Typically, a SCADA network architecture is a treelike structure and was designed as a closed system. The convergence of IT and OT systems have changed the
architecture of OT systems, with HMI workstations often connected to corporate intranets, with remote access
provided through virtual private networks (VPNs) or other remote access technologies. With these added
connections, OT infrastructure such as SCADA systems are exposed to vulnerabilities inherited from the IT
environment, opening vectors for network attacks against the SCADA system. This has increased the importance
of securing organisational networks which manage SCADA systems.
One defensive method is the use of network segregation (Sajid, Abbas, & Saleem, 2016). Network segregation is
separating an organisational network into sub-networks to mitigate against adversarial activities propagating
through the organisational network. This technique should be deployed in conjunction with active and passive
cyber defences. A firewall is an active cyber defence tool, commonly located at the entrance of the segregated
network (Gao et al., 2014). Firewall rules and policies should be implemented to monitor inbound and outbound
SCADA network traffic. A correctly configured firewall located on a segregated SCADA network should be
deployed along with an Intrusion Detection System (Sajid et al., 2016; SURF cert IDS, 2013). An IDS is a passive
cyber defence tool that monitors network traffic for any anomalous behaviour that could be attributed to
adversarial activities. An IDS should be placed within the SCADA network allowing for the detection of
adversarial activities. Though it is important to note that firewalls and IDSs are only as effective as the rules and
policies configured on these tools. With weaker rules and policies adversarial activities can go undetected on
SCADA systems. Further, an IDS is only useful when the alerts which are generated are investigated. The use of
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various defence tools and techniques is known as a defence in depth strategy and should be deployed to mitigate
the vulnerabilities of OT systems such as SCADA.

Figure 1: A simple SCADA network topology
Companies by nature aim to increase a return to their shareholders, therefore there is a requirement to optimise
their respective plants to achieve an increase in production and in turn revenue. This translates to optimised
performance and reduced overhead costs. To achieve this, access to the OT environment from the IT enterprise
domain was required to conduct analysis. This forced the convergence of IT to OT. The devices within the OT
environment were not designed to defend against cyber-attacks like those seen within the IT environment. Hence
this has left OT devices highly exposed (Murray, Johnstone, & Valli, 2017). Therefore it is acknowledged that
the increasing complexity of OT networks caused by IT connections requires tailored OT defence measures, such
as intrusion detection and intrusion prevention systems which counter vulnerabilities in both OT devices and
network protocols (Horkan, 2015).

SCADA SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES
SCADA systems started as standalone systems, with a defined gap between the IT systems and the OT systems,
with no access to the outside world, not alone the Internet. The early associated SCADA protocols were propriety
and the connections were through an RS-232 low speed serial cable (Shahzad et al., 2016). The original design of
SCADA systems was to ensure an optimised transfer of data, i.e. no data loss. There wasn’t any thought to the
SCADA design to include cybersecurity requirements.
To capture the vulnerability of SCADA systems, it is important to understand how an attack on a traditional IT
system has different priorities than an attack on an OT system. Traditionally in IT security where the concerns are
associated with financial integrity, denial of service or loss of information, properties can be grouped into
confidentiality, integrity and availability or CIA. This is also in the order of importance within an IT system.
Within an OT system, the order of importance is reversed to availability, integrity and then confidentiality. This
change of importance is due to the difference in conditions between IT and OT. In IT, data is paramount where
all processes are within the virtual environment. In OT, production is the number one requirement. There is a
crossover from the virtual environment to the physical environment, e.g. process control. Therefore in the OT
environment, there is a requirement for effective operation of the onsite plant and to ensure data is presented in
case of an emergency (Murray et al., 2017).
The purpose of an adversary can range from an individual who is trying to see if they can defeat the defences of
a plant. Conversely, it could be a nation state for the purposes of industrial espionage. As seen through the Triton
attack on a middle eastern oil and gas plant where the intent was to cause a high impact attack (Johnson et al.,
2017). Since Stuxnet, publicly reported cyber-attacks against OT systems have increased, a selection of which are
presented in Table 1.
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Table 1: Selected disclosed OT cyber-attacks, expanded from (Murray et al., 2017)
Year
2010

Cyber Attack
Stuxnet worm

2011

Steel plant infected
with Conficker
worm

2012

Computer Virus
targets Saudi
Arabian Oil
Company
Shamoon virus
affects computers at
Qatari gas firm
RasGas
Canadian Software
Manufacturing
Company Firewall
Breach
US Power Plant
Infected with
Malware
US Public utility
compromise

Nation state hackers attacked Saudi Aramco with
the Shamoon virus which infected 30,000
computers across the network, wiping hard drives
(Bronk & Tikk-Ringas, 2013).
Qatari gas firm RasGas became infected with the
Shamoon virus. The attack was believed to be state
sponsored (Mills, 2012).

2014

Dragonfly Group
Energy Industry
reconnaissance
campaign

2014

German Steel Mill
attack

2015

Blackenergy3
Ukraine power grid
cyber-attack

2015

Kemuri Water Plant

Reported that adversary group called Dragonfly
have been targeting the energy sector in the US
and Europe. Using IT based vectors, such as
phishing emails to pivot into OT networks (Braga,
2017).
A German Steel Mill was breached using social
engineering vectors to enter the company network
and further compromise the control system
network. The compromise resulted in preventing a
blast furnace from shutting down when required
(Robert M Lee, Asante, & Conway, 2014).
A suspected nation state adversary group attacked
a regional Ukraine power company, compromising
the ICS network causing a 3 hour power outage
(Robert M. Lee, Assante, & Conway, 2016).
Adversary compromised a water utility online
billing system, pivoting into the SCADA network
servers and holding the utility company ransom
(Leyden, 2016).

2017

Triton

2012

2012

2012

2014

Details
A sophisticated malware was installed via a thirdparty contractor using a USB drive to an Iran
nuclear facility. The malware infected the SCADA
system controlling the Nuclear centrifuges and
changed the values and mechanics to behave
abnormal (Schneier, 2010).
Network and Computer systems infected with the
Conficker worm, which spread across the
corporate and OT network systems.
Communications between the PLCs and field
devices were flooded, causing most control system
devices in become unresponsive (RISI, 2015).

Adversaries compromised the firewall system of
Telvent Canada Ltd, stealing critical project
SCADA files that were related to the OASyS
SCADA project (Krebs, 2012)
The malware was identified on a USB drive used
for control system configuration backups in a US
nuclear powerplant (Sanger, 2013).
Adversaries compromised a security system at a
US public utility through a brute-force password
attack (Kirk, 2014).

An oil and gas plant in Saudi Arabia was
compromised through remote access to an engineer
workstation. The adversary reprogrammed
controller units, causing fail safes to occur shutting
down the plant (Johnson et al., 2017).
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Outcome
Nuclear Centrifuges and
valves were
sabotaged/destroyed

The malware spread
throughout the network and
impact the communication
of SCADA systems and
field devices, which
resulted to latency and
partial outage on the
SCADA network.
30,000 corporate computers
systems wiped clean. The
corporate network was
down for several days.
The website and corporate
network of the organisation
was impacted for several
days.
Theft of critical and
sensitive project files
related to SCADA systems.
Compromised ICS system
with an undisclosed impact
to the operation.
The system was not directly
connected to other OT
equipment due to
maintenance.
Undisclosed, expected loss
of critical assets
information and business
operations process
Catastrophic damage to the
steel mill.

225,000 customers lost
power, deleted files from
the master boot records and
shut down communications.
Modified chlorine and
chemical levels on the
water used at the treatment
plants. 2.5 million customer
details stolen.
Failsafe systems worked
correctly
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APPROACHES TO DETECTING NETWORK ATTACKS IN OT
For detection of system-level events on specific devices operating in OT, operating system logs, and host-based
intrusion detection systems can be used. Host-Based intrusion detection systems (HIDS) monitor for system
changes in the device which the system monitors. HIDS however, utilise resources on the device it is monitoring
and thus are not commonly used in OT devices due to device resource constraints. System logs detail events which
occur on a device at an operating system-level and network-level. System logs are generated automatically by IT
devices but are not generated by default in OT devices. Typically, system logs from both device types when
available are sent to a server device for correlation and analysis. A downside of system logs in general is the
potential for tampering by an adversary. Given the data provided to the log server is provided by a potentially
untrustworthy source, i.e the adversary-controlled device, system logs may provide less meaningful data for
sophisticated, targeted attacks undertaken by organised adversaries, such as the BlackEnergy malware kit (MITRE
ATT&CK, 2018).
Network capture is used as part of Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS). Network captures record
network traffic occurring over a network, often using a standalone device and either at a flow-level or packetlevel. Network flows describe a series of network packets over a defined time duration, keeping high-level
information such as source, destination, protocol and packet length (J. Quittek, 2004). Packet level captures record
all information for each individual packet traversing a network. Due to finite storage requirements, network flows
are often used given the reduced storage requirement, however, the lack of semantic knowledge of the underlying
processes provided by network flows restricts their applicability to actionable detection measures (Hofstede et al.,
2014). Conversely, deep packet inspection provides all the semantic data regarding each network transaction, with
the added cost of increased storage. Drawing meaning from this wealth of knowledge however, is challenging, as
detection systems can be overwhelmed with noise. Filtering the noise is required to identify appropriate indicators
for detection. Indicators can be derived from expert knowledge of the individual system, learnt automatically
using machine learning approaches, or a combination of automated learning and expert acceptance.
For intrusion detection systems, there are two core designations, misuse (signature) based, and anomaly based.
Misuse based approaches are highly accurate at detecting known malicious events, given a rule is developed/exists
and is used. However, they cannot detect unknown attacks (Yuksel, den Hartog, & Etalle, 2016). Signatures exist
for a range of OT protocols, including ModBus, S7 and DNP3 (Bro, 2018; DigitalBond, 2018; Open Information
Security Foundation, 2018b) , through a range of open source signature IDS systems, such as Bro, Snort, Suricata
and Yara (Amann et al., 2018; CISCO, 2018; Open Information Security Foundation, 2018a; VirusTotal, 2018).
Alternatively, anomaly-based approaches use a learned model of normal transactions to identify anomalies in
data, based on either protocol semantics, process data, network transaction probabilities or physical process
models. A range of anomaly approaches based on the use of machine learning exist in literature such as (Carcano
et al., 2011; Caselli, Zambon, & Kargl, 2015; Yuksel et al., 2016), however, commercial machine learning
anomaly detection approaches are typically closed source. The difficulty with anomaly detection is understanding
what detected anomalies mean in the context of the system. For this reason, systems which automatically act on
anomalies are detrimental in OT networks, given the potential effect and risk to system availability if a false
positive is acted upon (NIST, 2007). While OT systems are more static than IT systems, if the behaviour is not
learnt during the training process, it will be classified as an anomalous action, even if it is a low interaction normal
device. Further, if adversary actions are already taking place in the network, the malicious behaviour may be
baselined (NIST, 2007). A means of online learning is required to increase the usability of many anomaly
detection approaches for OT systems.

DISCUSSION
The convergence of IT and OT systems has left OT devices exposed, as outlined by attack vectors used in OT
cyber-attacks. As noted by (Gregory-Brown, 2107) the devices that are perceived to be at the highest risk are IT
devices such as servers and workstations. These devices provide the entry vectors into OT systems and networks
through IT based vulnerabilities and then pivot into the internal OT network (Knapp & Langill, 2015). A summary
of attack vectors for 39 reported attacks collated from the RISI database between 2010 and 2014 are outlined in
Table 2. While the majority are undisclosed from this database, initial attack vectors are not complex, with
unauthorised access in these cases achieved through default credentials, or insider attackers, while USB based
entry vectors traverse network defences. Domain awareness of OT cyber threats is increasing with (Schwab
Wolfgang & Mathieu, 2018) reporting 77% of respondents identifying ICS cybersecurity as a major priority in
2018. A major challenge is the slow pace of OT system lifecycles when compared to IT systems.

Proceedings of the 16th Australian Information Security Management Conference (2018)

101

Table 2: OT entry vectors collated from RISI (2015)
Entry Vector
Undisclosed
Unauthorised Access
USB
Social Engineering
Phishing

Total Reported (%)
22 (56.4%)
9 (23.1%)
6 (15.4%)
1 (2.6%)
1 (2.6%)

OT environments such as SCADA systems were designed as closed systems, however the IT and OT convergence
has resulted in SCADA systems being connected to other networks including enterprise networks and the Internet
for productivity increases. Additionally, the order of security concerns within an IT environment is different to
those of the OT environment. Confidentiality of data is considered to be of utmost importance within the IT
environment, while the availability of data and services is of utmost importance within the OT environment
(Rezai, Keshavarzi, & Moravej, 2017; Zhu, Joseph, & Sastry, 2011). Given the differences in both environments,
IT based detection techniques are not adequate to detect OT threats (Keith Stouffer, Victoria Pillitteri, Suzanne
Lightman, Marshall Abrams, & Hahn, 2015). The focus of current research is on OT specific detection techniques
and method (Cherdantseva et al., 2016; Gao et al., 2014)
Detection in OT systems should leverage the wealth of knowledge provided by IT systems. Correlating system,
network and threat intelligence alerts between IT and OT systems can provide a whole system view for security
analysts who draw meaning from these complex interconnected systems. Given that the entry vector for OT cyberattacks are typically IT based due to system convergence, drawing inferences between actions in the whole system
will provide efficient, actionable remediations.
A key to having secure and controlled OT network and environments is hardening OT networks and systems with
a security focus. A deep understanding of both OT network architectures and IT network systems is required to
harden the environment. A defence in depth approach is key to hardening OT networks, including network
segmentation, firewalls and intrusion detection systems. However, securing OT systems requires more than
technical solutions. Policy, both internal and industry compliance, staff training and testable incident response
plans are also required (NIST, 2015).
Current anomaly detection approaches for OT systems rely on identifying variations in features of interest to
identify anomalies. These features are typically frequency based, such as an increase in connections from a host,
when compared to historical learnt behaviours. These features can be learnt from network data, process-based
semantics such as device or protocol definitions, and behaviours defined by system experts. The end result of
current anomaly detection alarms is an indicator that a value has deviated from normal. Additional semantic
meaning is required to evaluate if this is an indication of a cyber-attack or an infrequent normal action. Advanced
adversarial threats can overcome existing anomaly detection approaches when conforming to normal learnt action.
However, combining categorical data, such as command type or function code, with frequency based and timebased features into compound features provides both additional semantic meaning to alerts, in addition to richer
classification approaches. For example, using a write function may be defined as a normal action between two
devices, but added contextual behaviour, such as the value being written, and the time of transaction may indicate
a network attack when compared to normal operations. Future anomaly detection approaches for OT systems
should incorporate both process level semantics, and contextual behaviour to improve the rigour of anomaly
detection.
Ultimately, improved security of OT systems requires a fundamental change in the development mindset of OT
systems. From the hardware-level to high-level network protections, future OT networks will need to be designed
to be robust and secure, while maintaining the safety and availability requirements as convergence between IT
and OT systems manifests into the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). Further, the protocols which are currently
used in OT systems require updating to modern secure design standards. Existing protocols are insecure by design
and attempts to secure these protocols are met with resistance, or not integrated due to the optionality requirements
of the security functions for backwards compatibility with existing systems. Schneider Electric has recently
undertaken this process with the creation of Secure Modbus TCP, which uses Transport Layer Security (TLS),
digital certificates and role-based access control (Desruisseaux, 2018). While rebuilding protocols to embed
security from design can be costly, this approach to improving the security of OT protocols will provide the robust
security requirements of future connected OT systems.
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CONCLUSION
This paper sought to highlight current detection techniques in OT systems, and identify existing known challenges
and goals for the next generation of OT system, the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). OT systems such as
SCADA systems were originally designed as closed systems. However, the evolution of information/data
architectures and the convergence of IT and OT environments has driven the evolution of SCADA systems to
adopt an open network specification for communications. With the inclusion of added connections due to the
adaptation of an open network, OT infrastructure such as SCADA systems are exposed to vulnerabilities inherited
from the IT environment, opening vectors for network attacks against the SCADA system. In recent years cyberattacks have been launched exploiting vulnerabilities against OT systems.
Mitigation strategies such as a defence in depth security approach to hardening OT networks could be
implemented. In addition to gathering threat intelligence alerts from both IT and OT environments as well as
incorporating process level semantics and contextual behaviour for an anomaly based detection approach. As the
latest evolution of OT systems are IIoT based, rebuilding OT protocols with security embedded in the design is
costly but will provide the robust security requirements of future connected OT systems.
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